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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Cities are major actors in the process of trade. It is, therefore, fundamental to
understand (i) how the intensity of trade is inﬂuenced by their size and structure
and, conversely, (ii) how economic integration aﬀects the internal structure of cities.
This is what we undertake in this paper by modelling the interplay between trade
costs, commuting costs and communication costs. Our approach, which combines
basic ingredients from urban economics and new economic geography, explains how
decentralizing the production of goods in secondary employment centers may allow
large cities to retain a large share of ﬁrms and jobs in an integrating world.
Our starting point is that ﬁrms’ performances are aﬀected by the level of housing
and commuting costs, which we call “urban costs”. This occurs through the land
rent they pay to occupy central urban locations, and through the higher wages
they have to pay to their workers to compensate them for their longer commutes
and/or higher land rents. Hence, high urban costs render ﬁrms less competitive on
local and foreign markets alike. As a result, despite scale economies arising from
urban agglomeration (Duranton and Puga, 2004), increasing urban costs could shift
employment from large monocentric cities either to their suburbs or to distant and
smaller cities, where these costs are lower, at least once trade costs have suﬃciently
declined to permit large-scale exports to distant markets. In other words, economic
integration could well challenge the supremacy of large cities in favor of small cities.
The main point we wish to stress in this paper is that the emergence of subcenters
within cities is a powerful strategy for large cities to maintain their attractiveness.
Despite the many advantages provided by the inner city through a good access
to highly specialized services (Porter, 1995), ﬁrms or developers may choose to
form secondary employment centers, enterprise zones, or edge cities (Henderson
and Mitra, 1996). In this way, ﬁrms are able to pay lower wages and land rents
while retaining most of the beneﬁts generated by large urban agglomerations. And,
indeed, Timothy and Wheaton (2001) report large variations in wages according
to intra-urban location (15% higher in central Boston than in outlying work zones,
18% between central Minneapolis and the fringe counties). As they enjoy living on
larger plots and/or move along with ﬁrms, workers may also want to live in suburbia
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Consequently, the creation of subcenters within a city,
i.e. the formation of a polycentric city, appears to be a natural way to alleviate the
burden of urban costs. It is, therefore, no surprise that Anas et al. (1998) observe
that “polycentricity is an increasingly prominent feature of the landscape”.1
Thus, the escalation of urban costs in large cities seems to prompt a redeployment
of activities in a polycentric pattern, while smaller cities retain their monocentric
shape. However, for this to happen, ﬁrms set up in the secondary centers must
maintain a very good access to the main urban center, which requires low communi-
cation costs. Indeed, as pointed out by Schwartz (1993), about half of the business
services consumed by US ﬁrms located in suburbia are supplied in city centers. As
a result, by focusing on urban and communication costs, we recognize that both
1To illustrate, Giuliano and Small (1991) identify 29 job centers in Los Angeles, McMillen and
McDonald (1998) ﬁnd 15 in Chicago, and Creveso and Wu (1997) count 22 for the San Francisco
Bay Area.
2agglomeration and dispersion may take two quite separate forms because they are
now compounded by centralization or decentralization of activities within the same
city. Such a distinction is crucial for understanding the interaction between cities
and trade.
To achieve our goal, we develop a two-region model where regions have a spatial
extension that imposes commuting and communication costs whereas interregional
shipments of commodities imply trade costs. Unlike Helpman (1998), Tabuchi (1998)
and others, our framework allows cities to be polycentric. We will see how this seem-
ingly minor change sheds light on several important concrete issues that have been
pretty much overlooked until now. More precisely, we organize our main conclusions
around two main ideas: (i) local factors may change the global organization of the
economy,w h e r e a s( i i )global forces may aﬀect the local organization of cities.T h i s
interaction arises because the global organization of production and employment
may take diﬀerent forms as either a single polycentric city or two monocentric cities
may emerge, thus yielding very contrasted economic landscapes and trade patterns.
Regarding the ﬁrst idea, we focus on communication and commuting costs. When
these costs are high, the economic landscape is likely to be formed by several small
cities trading diﬀerentiated varieties. By contrast, when commuting and/or commu-
nication costs reach low values in each region, a large city emerges. In particular, by
facilitating the formation of secondary centers, the development of New Information
and Communication Technologies (in short NICTs) may prevent the re-dispersion
of activities between regions that a deep economic integration is expected to trigger
(Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
Concerning the second idea, our thought experiment is about trade costs. When
trade and commuting costs are large, agglomeration within a polycentric city is the
market outcome. This is because the decentralization of jobs leads to lower land
rents for workers and allows ﬁrms to pay them lower wages. This result agrees
with the formation of megalopolises in which employment is decentralized in several
centers that all belong to the same metropolitan area (MacMillen and Smith, 2003).
When trade costs fall below some threshold, the agglomeration becomes partial in
that it loses jobs to the beneﬁt of smaller cities because inter-city trade is cheaper.
Yet, even for fairly low trade costs, the large city is able to maintain its prevalence
because its polycentricity allows it to preserve its competitive position through lower
wages and land rent.
In the sections that follow, we ﬁrst describe our modeling strategy (section 2).
The intra-urban equilibrium is characterized in section 3, whereas the subsequent
section analyzes the urban system when cities have given structures. In section 5,
we study the impact of trade and communication costs on the size and structure of
cities. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 The spatial economy
Consider an economy with two regions, labelled r =1 ,2, separated by a given
physical distance, one sector and two primary goods, labor and land. Each region
3can be urbanized by accommodating ﬁrms and workers within a city, and is formally
described by a one-dimensional space X. Whenever a city exists, it has a central
business district (in short CBD) located at the origin 0 ∈ X. One would expect us
to explain why this CBD exists as well as why ﬁrms leaving the CBD want to be
together and form a secondary business district (in short SBD). Doing that would
require the introduction of local spatial externalities and local public goods that
would render the analysis much more involved from the technical point of view,
without adding much to our results. Indeed, our model has nothing new to add to
what is known in this domain. By contrast, we determine the sizes of CBD and
SBDs, thus the structure of each city, in the presence of inter-city trade and factor
mobility.2
Firms are free to locate in the CBD or to set up in the suburbs of the metro
where they form a SBD. Both the CBD and SBDs are assumed to be dimension-
less.3 In what follows, the superscript C is used to describe variables related to
the CBD, whereas S describes the variables associated with a SBD. Without loss
of generality, we focus on the right-hand side of the city, the left-hand side being
perfectly symmetrical. Distances and locations are expressed by the same variable
x measured from the CBD located at x =0in city r =1 ,2 whereas the SBD, if any,
is established at xS
r > 0, which is endogenous.
Even though ﬁrms consume services supplied in each SBD, the higher-order
functions (speciﬁc local public goods and non-tradeable business-to-business services
such as marketing, banking, insurance) are still located in CBD (Schwartz, 1993).
Hence, for using such services, ﬁrms set up in a SBD must incur a communication
cost,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
K(xS
r )=K + kxS
r (1)
where K and k are two positive constants. Indeed, communicating requires the
acquisition of speciﬁc facilities, thus explaining why communication costs have a
ﬁxed component. However, relationships between the CBD and a SBD also involves
face-to-face communication. Therefore, some workers must go to the CBD, thus
making communication costs dependent on the distance xS
r between the CBD and
the SBD. For simplicity, we assume that this cost is linear in distance, but this does
not aﬀect the nature of our results.
Both the CBD and the SBD are surrounded by residential areas occupied by
workers. Furthermore, as the distance between the CBD and SBD is small com-
pared to the intercity distance, we disregard the intra-urban transport cost of goods.
Finally, for analytical convenience we restrict ourselves to the case of two SBDs. It
should be clear, however, that our analysis can be extended to several subcenters as
communication costs get smaller.
Under those various assumptions, the location and size of the SBDs as well as
the size of the CBD are endogenously determined. In other words, apart from the
2Thus, we diﬀer from Fujita et al. (1999) because cities have a spatial extension and an en-
dogenous structure. Unlike them, however, the inter-city distance is given. We also diﬀer from
Henderson (1974) who considers monocentric cities and zero transport costs between cities.
3In Cavailhes et al. (2004), we suppose that ﬁrms consume land, thus implying that clusters
have a spatial size. This makes the analytical treatment of the model more cumbersome without
changing the nature of our results.
4assumed existence of the CBD, the internal structure of each city is endogenous.
2.2 Workers
The economy is endowed with L mobile workers. The welfare of a worker depends
on her consumption of the following three goods. The ﬁrst good is unproduced and
homogenous.4 It is assumed to be costlessly tradeable and chosen as the numéraire.
The second good is produced as a continuum n of varieties of a horizontally diﬀeren-
tiated good under monopolistic competition and increasing returns, using labor as
the only input. Any variety of this good can be shipped from one city to the other
at a unit cost of τ > 0 units of the numéraire. The third good is land; without loss
of generality, we set the opportunity cost of land to zero.
Each worker living in city r consumes a residential plot of ﬁx e ds i z ec h o s e na s
the unit of area.5 The worker also chooses a quantity q(i) of variety i ∈ [0,n],a n d
aq u a n t i t yq0 of the numéraire. She is endowed with one unit of labor and q0 > 0
units of the numéraire. The initial endowment q0 is supposed to be large enough
for her consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome.
Each worker commutes to her employment center - without cross-commuting - and
bears a unit commuting cost given by t>0, so that for the worker located at x the
commuting cost is either tx or t
¯ ¯x − xS
r
¯ ¯ according to the employment center.
The budget constraint of an individual residing at x ∈ X in city r and working
in the corresponding CBD can then be written as follows:
Z n
0
pr(i)q(i)di + q0 + RC
r (x)+tx = wC
r + q0 (2)
where RC
r (x) is the land rent prevailing at a distance x from the CBD. The bud-
get constraint of an individual working in the SBD is obtained by replacing tx by
t
¯ ¯x − xS
r
¯ ¯, RC
r (x) by RS
r (x),a n dwC
r by wS
r . Thus, as in Ogawa and Fujita (1980),
commuting costs and wages are endogenously determined by the global distribution
of ﬁrms and workers within the city.
Preferences over the diﬀerentiated product and the numéraire are identical across
workers and represented by a quasi-linear utility encapsulating a quadratic sub-
utility:
















where α > 0 and β > γ > 0. The condition β > γ implies that workers have a
preference for variety.
4The model can easily be extended by introducing a second sector producing the homogenous
good under constant returns and perfect competition, using an immobile factor.
5Allowing for a variable lot size makes the analysis much more involved without aﬀecting the
nature of our results. See Tabuchi (1998) for a study of the monocentric-city case.
52.3 Firms
Technology in manufacturing is such that producing q(i) units of variety i requires
ag i v e nn u m b e rφ of labor units.6 There are no scope economies so that, due to
increasing returns to scale, there is a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrms and
varieties. Thus, the total number of ﬁr m si sg i v e nb yn = L/φ. Labor market
clearing implies that the number of ﬁrms located (or varieties produced) in city r is
such that nr = λrn,w h e r eλr stands for the share of workers residing in r.
Denote by ΠC
r (resp., ΠS
r ) the proﬁto faﬁr ms e tu pi nt h eC B D( r e s p . ,t h eS B D )
of city r.L e tθr be the share of ﬁrms located in the CBD of city r and, therefore, by
(1 − θr)/2 the share of ﬁrms in its right-hand side SBD. When the ﬁrm producing
variety i is located in the CBD of city r,i t sp r o ﬁt function is given by:
ΠC
r (i)=Ir(i) − φwC
r (4)
where Ir(i) stands for the ﬁrm’s revenue earned from local sales and from exports
(see (14) below). When the ﬁr ms e t su pi nt h eS B Do ft h es a m ec i t y ,i t sp r o ﬁt
function becomes:
ΠS
r (i)=Ir(i) − φwS
r − K(xS
r ) (5)
where the ﬁrm’s revenue is the same as in the CBD because shipping varieties within
the city is costless so that prices and outputs do not depend on ﬁrm’s location in
the city. Those two expressions encapsulate the trade-oﬀ faced by ﬁrms located in
city r: by locating at the SBD, ﬁrms are able to pay a lower wage to workers, but
must incur the communication cost K(xS
r ).
2.4 Market structure
Solving the budget constraint for the numéraire consumption, plugging the corre-
sponding expression into (3) and taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q(i)
yields
α − (β − γ)q(i) − γ
Z n
0
q(j)dj = p(i) i ∈ [0,n].
The demands for a variety i produced in city r by a worker living in city r and a
worker living in city s can then be written, respectively, as follows:
qrr(i)=a − (b + cn)prr(i)+cPr (6)
qrs(i)=a − (b + cn)prs(i)+cPs (7)
where prr(i) (resp., prs(i)) denotes the price a variety-i ﬁrm located in city r charges
to consumers living in city r (resp., city s 6= r)a n dPr t h ea v e r a g ep r i c e( u pt on)







psr(i)dis 6= r. (8)
6When a second sector is considered, we may assume that the production of q(i) units of variety
i requires mq(i) units of the immobile factor. Without loss of generality, we may then set m =0
(Ottaviano et al., 2002).
6Furthermore, we have a ≡ αb, b ≡ 1/[β+(n−1)γ] and c ≡ [γ/(β−γ)]b. Parameter a
expresses the desirability of the diﬀerentiated product with respect to the numéraire
and may, therefore, be viewed as a measure of the size of this market; b gives the
link between individual and industry demands: when b rises, consumers become
more sensitive to price diﬀerences. Finally, parameter c is an inverse measure of
the degree of product diﬀerentiation between varieties; when c →∞ , varieties are
perfect substitutes, whereas they are independent for c =0 .
Firm i located in city r faces a downward sloping demand in city r and city
s 6= r:
Qrr(i)=λrLqrr(i) Qrs(i)=λsLqrs(i)
where qrr(i) and qrs(i) are given by (6) and (7), respectively.
As empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms practice some form of spatial price
discrimination (Greenhut, 1981; Engel and Rogers, 1996; Haskel and Wolf, 2001),
we assume that markets are spatially segmented, which means that each ﬁrm chooses
a delivered price speciﬁc to the city in which its variety is sold. As the price of a
variety does not vary within a city, the total revenue of ﬁrm i l o c a t e di nc i t yr is
given by
Ir(i)=prr(i)Qrr(i)+[ prs(i) − τ]Qrs(i).
Because there is a continuum of ﬁrms, each ﬁrm has a negligible impact on the
market outcome in the sense that it may accurately ignore its inﬂuence on, and
hence reactions from, other ﬁrms. However, aggregate market conditions of some
kind (here the price index Pr)a ﬀect any single ﬁrm. This deﬁnes a setting in which
individual ﬁrms are not competitive (in the classic economic sense of having inﬁnite
demand elasticity) but, at the same time, they have no strategic interactions with
one another. Because varieties are symmetric, all ﬁrms located in the same city














s 6= r. (10)
It thus appears that the equilibrium price prevailing in a city decreases with the
number of ﬁrms located there, but increases with the level of trade costs. Finally,
even though factor prices do not enter (9)-(10) because they have the nature of a
ﬁxed cost, they have a negative impact on the number of ﬁrms set up in city r,
whence an indirect positive impact on equilibrium prices.
Substituting (10) into the demands (6)-(7) and using (8), the equilibrium con-
sumption levels can be expressed as follows:
q∗
rr = a − bp∗
rr + cnsτ/2 (11)
q∗
rs = q∗
ss − (b + cn)τ/2. (12)
Not surprisingly, high trade costs raise the local demand for each locally produced
variety at the expense of varieties produced in the other city. This substitution eﬀect
decreases when varieties becomes more diﬀerentiated.





















while the equilibrium revenue of a ﬁrm located in r i sm a yb ee x p r e s s e da sf o l l o w s :








Both (13) and (14) depend on the distribution of workers between the two cities.
It remains to determine the conditions to be imposed on τ for trade to occur
between cities at the equilibrium prices regardless of the interregional distribution
of workers. This is so if and only if the equilibrium demand q∗
rs is positive for any
distribution of workers. It is readily veriﬁed that this condition is equivalent to:
τ < τtrade ≡
2aφ
2bφ + cL
which is assumed to hold throughout the paper. This condition also guarantees that
it is always proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to export to the other city (p∗
rs − τ > 0).
To sum-up, we consider a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium model involving labor,
land as well as a diﬀerentiated product and a homogeneous good. At the global
level, increasing returns at the plant level are the agglomeration force whereas urban
costs are the dispersion force. At the city level, communication costs act as the
agglomeration force and commuting costs as the dispersion force. In the next section,
w es t u d yt h ec i t ye q u i l i b r i u mw i t h i no n ec i t yb e f o r ec o n s i d e r i n gt h ec a s eo fa nu r b a n
system in the subsequent section.
3 Decentralization within a city
A city equilibrium is such that each individual maximizes her utility subject to her
budget constraint, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts and markets clear. Individuals
choose their workplace (CBD or SBD) and their residential location with respect
to given wages and land rents. In each workplace (CBD or SBD), the equilibrium
wages are determined by a bidding process in which ﬁrms compete for workers by
oﬀering them higher wages until no ﬁrm can proﬁtably enter the market. Given
such equilibrium wages and the location of workers, ﬁrms choose to locate either in
the CBD or in the SBD. At the city equilibrium, no ﬁrm has an incentive to change
place within the city, and no worker wants to change her working place and/or
her residence. In this section, we analyze such an equilibrium, taking as ﬁxed the
number of workers. To ease the burden of notation, we drop the subscript r.
3.1 Land rents, wages and workplaces
Within each city, a worker chooses her location so as to maximize her utility (3)
under the budget constraint (2). Let ΨC(x) and ΨS(x) be the bid rent at x ∈ X of
an individual working respectively in the CBD and the SBD. Land is allocated to
8the highest bidder.7 Because there is only one type of labor, at the city equilibrium






Denote by y the right endpoint of the area formed by residents working in the CBD.
Let z1 be the endpoint of the residential area on the left-hand side of the SBD,
and z2 the symmetrical residential endpoint, which is also the outer limit of the city.
Because communication costs to the CBD increase with distance, the two residential
areas are adjacent when the city is polycentric, which implies y = z1. Therefore, the











where l is the city size and θ the share of ﬁrms located in the CBD. Note that the bid
rents at y and z2 a r ee q u a lt oz e r ob e c a u s et h el o ts i z ei sﬁxed and the opportunity
cost of land is zero. An illustration of the land rent proﬁle is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Because of the ﬁxed lot size assumption, at the city equilibrium the value of the





is the same regardless of the worker’s location. Then, the budget constraint of an
individual residing at x and working in the CBD implies that wC + q0 − R(x) −
tx = E, whereas the budget constraint of an individual working in the SBD is
wS + q0 − R(x) − t
¯ ¯x − xS¯ ¯ = E. At the city equilibrium, the worker living at the
right-endpoint y of the CBD residential area (or at the left-endpoint z1 of the SBD
residential area) is indiﬀerent between working in the CBD or in the SBD, which
implies
wC − R(y) − ty = wS − R(z1) − t(xS − z1).
Because y = z1 and R(y)=R(z1)=0 , this equation becomes




w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ee x p r e s s i o n so fxS and z1 g i v e ni n( 1 5 ) .T h u s ,the diﬀerence
in the wages paid in the CBD and in the SBD compensates exactly the worker for
the diﬀerence in the corresponding commuting costs. The wage wedge wC − wS is
positive as long as θ > 1/3, thus implying that the size of the CBD exceeds the
size of each SBD (recall that another SBD exists on the left-hand side of the CBD).
Observe that a rise in the population size increases the wage wedge: as the average
commuting cost rises, ﬁrms located in the CBD must pay a higher wage to their
workers.
7Utilities being quasi-linear, the structure of land ownership across indivuals is immaterial for
our analysis provided that the distribution is atomless.
93.2 Equilibrium wages and the city structure
Regarding the labor markets, the equilibrium wages of workers are determined by
the zero-proﬁt condition. In other words, operating proﬁts are completely absorbed
by the wage bill. Hence, the equilibrium wage rates in the CBD and in the SBD
must satisfy the conditions ΠC(wC∗)=0and ΠS(wS∗)=0 , respectively. Thus,








Hence wC∗ − wS∗ = K(xS)/φ, which means that the equilibrium wage wedge is
proportional to the level of the communication cost that prevails at the SBD.
Substituting (17) and (1) into (16) and solving with respect to θ yields:
θ =
4K +( tφ + k)l
(3tφ − k)l
which is positive and exceeds 1/3 i fa n do n l yi fk/3φ <t , which means that com-
muting costs are large relative to distance-sensitive communication costs. When this
condition is not satisﬁed, the city is monocentric regardless of the value of commut-
ing costs.8 Assuming from now on that k<3tφ holds, we have
θ∗ =m i n
½
1,




Observe ﬁrst that θ∗ =1 /3 when K = k =0because the city is formed by three
identical employment centers. Furthermore, when θ∗ < 1, increasing the population
size leads to a decrease in the relative size of the CBD, though its absolute size rises,
whereas both the relative and absolute sizes of the SBD rises. Indeed, increasing
the size of the labor force leads to a more than proportionate increase in the wage
rate prevailing in the CBD. This is because of the corresponding rise in the average
commuting cost. The number of ﬁrms being ﬁxed, this in turn implies that more
ﬁrms choose to set up in the SBD at the expense of the CBD. Last, as long as θ∗ < 1,
the higher the communication cost (either K or k), the larger the CBD. In the same
way, the lower the commuting cost, the larger the CBD size.





Hence, a polycentric city is more likely to occur when commuting costs are large,
communication costs are low, and the population size is large. This agrees with Anas
et al. (1998) who observe that by the end of the 19th century telephones have made
it possible for US ﬁrms to decentralize, whereas NICTs play nowadays a comparable
role. By contrast, a high degree of increasing returns favors the centralization of
production.
We may summarize the main results of that analysis in the following proposition.
8In this case, the analysis provided in Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) in which all workers are mobile
applies.
10Proposition 1 A city is monocentric if and only if t ≤ (2K + kl)/φl.O t h e r w i s e ,
the city is polycentric.













l + xS − x
¶
for x>x S. (21)
Workers’ bid rents around the SBD are maximized at xS whereas ΨS(z1)=0 .T h e
gap ΨC(x) − ΨS(|x − xS|) > 0 at any given x r i s e sa st h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h eC B D
increases. Note also that the households’ bid rents functions ΨC and ΨS in the CBD
and the SBD are identical once the employment centers have the same size, that is,
θ∗ =1 /3.
4 Urban system and inter-city trade
Consider now our two-city setting in which workers are free to choose the city in
w h i c ht h e yw a n tt ol i v e . L e tλ be the endogenous share of workers residing in
city 1.A global equilibrium arises at 0 < λ∗ < 1 when the utility diﬀerential
∆V (λ∗) ≡ V1(λ∗) − V2(λ∗)=0 ,o ra tλ∗ =1when ∆V (1) ≥ 0. An interior
equilibrium is stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility diﬀerential ∆V is
strictly negative in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., d∆V (λ)/dλ < 0 at λ∗,
whereas an agglomerated equilibrium is stable whenever it exists. What makes our
analysis richer, but more complex, is the fact that the utility diﬀerential ∆V is not
uniquely deﬁned in that it varies with the internal structure of cities. Consequently,
when we deal with a conﬁguration involving only monocentric (resp., polycentric)
cities, we must consider the possibility of a deviation toward a polycentric (resp.,
monocentric) city when studying the existence and stability of an equilibrium.
The indirect utility of an individual working in the CBD is given by
V C(λ)=S∗ + wC∗ − CC + q0 (22)
where S∗ is the consumer surplus given by (13) and CC the urban costs borne by
this individual. Using (20), it is readily veriﬁed that




If she works in the SBD (if any), her indirect utility becomes
V S(λ)=S∗ + wS∗ − CS + q0
where CS now denotes the urban costs the individual bears. Using (21), we have




11Two comments are in order. First, the equilibrium allocation of workers within
each city depends on the global distribution of workers between cities through the
value of λ. In particular, workers are distributed at the city equilibrium in a way
such that
V C(λ)=V S(λ).
Likewise, when λn ﬁrms are established in city 1, ﬁrms are distributed at the city
equilibrium such that ΠC(λ)=ΠS(λ)=0when SBDs exist. Second, when deciding
whether or not to move from one city to the other, workers know whether the cities
of origin and destination are monocentric and/or polycentric; they also know the
land rent that prevails in each one of them.
In order to determine the stable conﬁgurations, we deﬁne two critical values of t














Without loss of generality, we may assume that λ ≥ 1/2,s ot h a tt1 ≤ t2.U s i n g
Proposition 1, it is easily seen that the following three global patterns may emerge:
(i) when t<t 1, both cities are monocentric, (ii) when t1 <t<t 2,c i t y1 is polycentric
and city 2 is monocentric, and (iii) when t2 <t , both cities are polycentric. Hence,
under dispersion (λ =1 /2), we have t1 = t2 = TD where
TD ≡ 4K/φL + k/φ
so that the two cities are monocentric if t<T D and polycentric if t>T D. Similarly,
under agglomeration (λ =1 ), t1 = TA where
TA ≡ 2K/φL + k/φ <T D
and t2 →∞ ; thus, agglomeration arises in a monocentric city when t<T A or in a
polycentric city when t>T A.
In order to determine what a global equilibrium is, we must consider the utility
diﬀerential corresponding to each of the three foregoing patterns. In what follows,
we study the cases in which (i) no city is polycentric, (ii) one city is polycentric and
the other monocentric, and (iii) no city is monocentric. Because one region may be
empty in the ﬁrst and third cases, our analysis will allow us to identify all stable
equilibria.
4.1 The monocentric case
Assume that t<t 1 so that no city is polycentric: θ∗ =1for all λ ∈ [1/2,1].A s
mentioned above, the equilibrium wages are given by a bidding process in which ﬁrms
compete for workers by oﬀering them higher wages until no ﬁr mc a ne a r np o s i t i v e
proﬁts, given by (4), in the CBD of either city. Using (13) and the equilibrium
wages given in Appendix, it is readily veriﬁed that the utility diﬀerential with two
monocentric cities (with subscript mm) is as follows (up to a positive and constant
factor):
∆mmV (λ) ≡ δmm(λ − 1/2) (26)
12where
δmm ≡− ε1τ2 + ε2τ − ε3t
with
ε1 ≡ (bφ + cL)(6b2φ2 +6 bφcL + c2L2) > 0
ε2 ≡ 4aφ(bφ + cL)(3bφ +2 cL) > 0
ε3 ≡ 2(2bφ + cL)2φ2 > 0.
When t<T D, Proposition 1 implies that λ =1 /2 with two monocentric cities
is feasible. Note that the condition t<T D also prevents a marginal deviation to
a polycentric city to occur because, in the vicinity of λ =1 /2, the city in region 2
must be monocentric. The dispersed conﬁguration with two monocentric cities is,





which is positive for all admissible value of τ because τtrade < ε2/ε1.T h u s ,λ∗ =1 /2
is stable when t>t m and t<T D.
When t<t m, dispersion between two identical monocentric cities is no longer
stable. If t<T A, λ =1with a monocentric city is feasible. Because ∆mmV (1) > 0
when t<t m whereas the city in region 2 is always monocentric in the vicinity of
λ =1 , λ∗ =1is a stable equilibrium when t<t m and t<T A.
The discussion above may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 If t<t m and t<T A, there exists a stable global equilibrium in
which the industry is agglomerated into a single monocentric city. If tm <t<T D,
there exists a stable global equilibrium in which the industry is dispersed between two
monocentric cities of equal size.
Note, ﬁrst, that communication costs have to be suﬃciently large to fulﬁll the
condition t<T A. If communication costs are very low (formally K = k =0 ),
the global economy never involves monocentric cities. When they are large, ag-
glomeration in a monocentric city may occur provided that commuting costs are
suﬃciently low (t<t m). Once commuting costs get larger (t>t m), the industry
is dispersed between two monocentric cities. Hence, a pattern involving two sym-
metric and monocentric cities is more likely to emerge when both commuting and
communication costs are high.
However, for the dispersed pattern with two monocentric cities to arise, it must
be that tm <T D.A s ε2 increases with a whereas ε1, ε3 and TD are independent
of a, this condition is satisﬁed when the parameter a does not exceed the unique
solution am to the equation
ε2τ = ε1τ2 + ε3TD.
In other words, the size of the diﬀerentiated product market cannot be too large,
a<a m, for two monocentric cities to be a global equilibrium.
13Otherwise, when a>a m -h e n c etm >T D - the industry is agglomerated in a
single monocentric city as long as t<T A:t h e r e i s b o t h agglomeration and cen-
tralization. This form of extreme agglomeration arises because the intensiﬁcation of
price competition that such a global structure brings about is itself compensated by
as u ﬃciently large market size eﬀect (a>a m).
4.2 The mixed case
We now come to the case in which cities have diﬀerent internal structures. With-
out loss of generality, we may assume that city 1 is polycentric whereas city 2 is
monocentric: θ∗
1 < 1 and θ∗
2 =1or, equivalently, t1 <t<t 2 where both t1 and
t2 are unknown. Note that, when this condition holds, it implies λ > 1/2 so that
the industry is split between the two regions in a way such that the polycentric city
hosts the majority of workers.
Using the equilibrium wages given in Appendix, it is readily veriﬁed that the
equation of motion - with subscript pm - is now given (up to a positive and constant
factor) by





















Since ∆pmV (λ) is linear, the intermediate value theorem implies that the interval
(1/2,1) contains a unique equilibrium, given by λ∗ = −δ2/δ1 ∈ (1/2,1),i fa n do n l y
if ∆pmV (1/2) and ∆pmV (1) have opposite signs. Furthermore, this equilibrium is
stable when the two inequalities ∆pmV (1/2) > 0 and ∆pmV (1) < 0 hold because
∆pmV (λ) is then monotone decreasing. This in turn implies that δ1 < 0.T h eﬁrst
condition (∆pmV (1/2) > 0)i se q u i v a l e n tt ot>T D, whereas the second (∆pmV (1) <
0) amounts to
−ε1τ2 + ε2τ − ε3












− tφ − k
#
.
Note that city 1 is polycentric and city 2 monocentric because the two conditions
∆pmV (1/2) < 0 < ∆pmV (1) are met.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 If t>T D and K>K, there exists a stable global equilibrium in
which the industry is split between a large polycentric city and a small monocentric
city.
144.3 The polycentric case
It remains to consider the case where t>t 2 so that no city is monocentric (with
subscript pp): θ∗ < 1 for all λ ∈ [1/2,1]. Using the equilibrium wages given in
Appendix, the equation of motion becomes
∆ppV (λ)=δpp(λ − 1/2) (27)
where







As δmm and δpp diﬀer only through the last term, the argument is similar to the one
developed in subsection 4.1.
When t>T D, Proposition 1 implies λ =1 /2 with two polycentric cities is
feasible. Note that t>T D also prevents a marginal deviation to a monocentric
city to occur because the city in region 2 must be polycentric in the vicinity of
λ =1 /2. Therefore, the dispersed conﬁguration with two polycentric cities is a
global equilibrium when t>T D.I ti ss t a b l ei fδpp < 0 or, equivalently, t>t p,w h i c h
is the larger solution of δpp =0 . This is because the smaller solution violates the
condition k<3tφ.N o t e t h a t tp is positive for all admissible value of τ because
τtrade < ε2/ε1.T h u s ,λ∗ =1 /2 is stable if t>t p and t>T D.
When t<t p, dispersion between two identical polycentric cities ceases to be
stable. If t>T A, agglomeration within a polycentric city is feasible. Because
∆ppV (1) > 0 when t>t p, λ∗ =1is a stable equilibrium as long as ∆pmV (1) > 0,
which is itself equivalent to K<K.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 If t>T A and K<K, there exists a stable global equilibrium in
which the industry is agglomerated into a single polycentric city. If t>T D and
t>t p, there exists a stable global equilibrium in which the industry is dispersed
between two polycentric cities of equal size.
Hence, high distance-sensitive communication costs can prevent the emergence
of a single polycentric city because K<0,e v e nw h e nc o m m u t i n gc o s t sa r el a r g e
(t>T A). In addition, for agglomeration in a polycentric city to occur, it must be
that t>T A and K<K. It is easy to show that the latter condition holds if and
only if a>a p,w h e r eap is the unique solution to the equation
ε2τ = ε1τ2 + ε3
t(tφ + k +4 K/L)
3tφ − k
.
Consequently, when the market size eﬀect is strong (a>a p), agglomeration within
a polycentric city takes place. Because ap is smaller than am, agglomeration is sus-
tained for weaker market size eﬀects in one polycentric city than in one monocentric
city. This shows once more that dispersion is a less likely outcome when the size of
the diﬀerentiated product market is large.
When commuting costs are large (t>t p) and communication costs low (TD is
small), workers alleviate the burden of urban costs by having two polycentric cities:
15there is both dispersion and decentralization. In other words, the global organization
of the production is associated with the lowest level of urban costs in the economy.
Observe that a strong reduction in trade costs leads to low values of tp, thus fostering
the dispersion of the industry, which now takes the form of two polycentric cities.
Because tp exceeds tm, agglomeration is sustainable over a larger set of t-values in
the polycentric case than in the monocentric case.
Note, ﬁnally, that the conﬁguration involving one polycentric city and one mono-
centric city is sustainable over a larger set of parameter values than the dispersed
conﬁguration with two polycentric cities. The reason is as follows. When a dis-
persed conﬁguration with two polycentric cities is a stable equilibrium, the condi-
tions t>T D and t>t p must hold. We know that t>t p is equivalent to δpp < 0.
If δpp < 0,t h e nK<0 also holds by (28). This implies the condition K>K is
always met, so that Proposition 3 holds. In other words, partial agglomeration is
also a stable outcome.
4.4 Summary results
Propositions 2 to 4 reveal the existence of ﬁve stable conﬁgurations: (A) a single
monocentric city (λ∗ =1and θ∗ =1 ), denoted (m,0); (B) two identical monocentric
cities (λ∗ =1 /2 and θ∗ =1 ), denoted (m,m); (C) a single polycentric city (λ∗ =
1 and θ∗ < 1), denoted (p,0); (D) two identical polycentric cities (λ∗ =1 /2 and
θ∗ < 1), denoted (p,p); and (E) one large polycentric city and one small monocentric
city (λ∗ ∈ (1/2,1), θ∗
1 < 1 and θ∗
2 =1 ), denoted by (p,m).T h o s e ﬁve equilibria
are illustrated in the (K,t)-a n d(τ,t)-planes in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. It is
readily veriﬁed that, in both ﬁgures, the positive orthant is fully covered by the set
of conditions identiﬁed through Proposition 2 to 4. However, this covering does not
deﬁne a partition because of the multiplicity of stable equilibria.
Figure 2
Figure 3
Interestingly, a partial agglomeration may emerge as an equilibrium outcome
once it is recognized that SBDs can exist, while such a conﬁguration never arises in
standard NEG-models (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004). Another interesting feature of
the partial agglomeration pattern is that it involves intra-industry and asymmetric
trade in the diﬀerentiated product together with intersectoral trade.
5 Interaction between local and global forces
In this section, we study the impact of changes in commuting costs, communication
costs and trade costs on the location of ﬁrms within and between cities. Our re-
sults are organized around the following two ideas: (i) local factors may well change
the global organization of the economy, whereas (ii) global forces may aﬀect the
local/urban organization of production and employment. From the historical point
16of view, we ﬁnd it interesting to consider two cases. We ﬁrst study how falling com-
munication and commuting costs aﬀects the space-economy. Next, we will consider
the usual thought experiment of NEG, namely the impact of falling trade costs on
the global distribution of ﬁrms and workers. The diﬀerence is that the structure of
cities now depends on the evolution of the interregional distribution of activities,
which aﬀects itself the way cities are organized.
5.1 How the local aﬀects the global
5.1.1 The impact of communication costs
Consider the case of communication costs decreasing from high to low values. For
conciseness, we focus on the sole ﬁxed component K. As shown by Figure 2, which
is drawn for the case where tm >k / φ, the evolution of the space-economy changes
according to the value of commuting costs. Three cases appear to be relevant.
Assume, ﬁrst, that t exceeds tp.W h e n K is large, the economy involves two
monocentric cities because commuting costs are too large to aﬀord the agglomeration
of activities within a single city. Once K decreases and crosses the line t = TD,
the economy may follow two very diﬀerent paths. Along the ﬁrst one, dispersion
still prevails but the two monocentric citi e sa r en o wp o l y c e n t r i c . T h i si sb e c a u s e
communication costs have suﬃciently decreased to permit the decentralization of
some activities within each city. However, SBDs remain small when K has not
decreased by a suﬃciently large amount. By contrast, when K is very small, each
city is formed by three areas having almost the same size. Between these two polar
cases, as K decreases the CBD of each city shrinks whereas its SBDs grow, the
whole process being smooth (see Proposition 1). Along the second path, there is
a bifurcation at the crossing point as revealed by the emergence of a polycentric
city whose additional population comes from the other city, which then remains
monocentric. The economic space becomes asymmetric and, as communication costs
decrease, the large city grows at the expense of the small city. In this case, falling
communication costs increase the size of the polycentric city (dλ∗/dK < 0). This is
because suﬃciently low values of K trigger the decentralization of production. This



















In the second case, we have tm <t<t p. Again, the economic space involves
two monocentric cities when K is large. Ignoring for the moment the shaded area
in which two stable equilibria exist, we see from Figure 2 that, when K falls, city
1 expands gradually under the form of a polycentric structure, whereas the mono-
centric city 2 shrinks. Eventually, when K becomes smaller than K, the large city
17accommodates all workers and city 2 vanishes. There is agglomeration within a sin-
gle polycentric city. Again, as shown by Proposition 1, the size of city 1 increases
gradually from L/2 to L.W et h u sh a v e :
(m,m) → (p,m) → (p,0) (case 2)
It remains to consider the third case in which k/φ <t<t m. For large values of
K, the economy has a single monocentric city, which may correspond to an isolated
“city-state”. When the line t = TA is crossed, the city-state ceases to be monocentric
and two small SBDs are created. As K keeps decreasing, the city still retains the
whole population of workers, but its CBD loose more and more activities at the
beneﬁt of its SBDs. Here also, Proposition 1 implies that the transition process is
smooth. This is summarized as follows:
(m,0) → (p,0) (case 3)
To sum up, when communication costs decrease, two contrasted pictures emerge.
In the former (cases 1.1 and 3), the global organization of the economy remains the
same (λ∗ =1 /2 or λ∗ =1 ). The decrease in communications cost aﬀects only the
city structure, which becomes more decentralized. In the latter (cases 1.2 and 2), the
reduction of communication costs leads to an imbalanced distribution of activities
as well as to asymmetric trade (1/2 < λ∗ < 1). In other words, the global economy,
the structure of cities and the nature of trade are all aﬀected. It should then be clear
that any simple prediction made about the impact the development NICTs could
have on the spatial organization of the economy is likely to be inaccurate.
Note also that in all, except one, cases, the spatial evolution of the economy is
smooth, a result that vastly diﬀers from what is known in standard NEG-models
(Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004). The only case that shows a strong discontinuity
arises when the evolution path goes through the shaded area. Urban inertia suggests
that the economy retains its previous (m,m) structure when K and t belong to this
area.9 When the path gets out of the shaded area, the economy shifted abruptly
from dispersion with two monocentric cities to one polycentric city, that is, the most
drastic transformation the spatial economy may experience.
The evolution of the urban landscape described above is to be contrasted to what
happens when cities are, by assumption, monocentric. In this case, it follows from
Figure 2 that the global equilibrium is always given by (m,0) as long as t is smaller
than tm, whereas this equilibrium is given by (m,m) when t exceeds tm. This shows
that the (partial) agglomeration of activities may be sustained over a larger domain
of parameters when cities can be polycentric.
5.1.2 The impact of commuting costs
Regarding commuting costs, the following remarks are worth making. First, what-
ever the value of K, agglomeration is always the single global equilibrium when
9Urban inertia is strengthened by the durability of the housing stock, a variable not taken into
account here (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
18commuting costs are low (t<t m), but never when t is high (t>t p). This may be
explained as follows. When cities are monocentric, it is readily veriﬁed that
dCC
dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=1
> 0




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗∈[1/3,1)
> 0 j = C,S
where Cj is given by (24). Hence, regardless of the city structure, urban costs
borne by workers decrease as commuting costs fall. Consequently, net wages increase
regardless of workers’ residential location. This implies that more workers are willing
to choose to set up in a single city. This larger concentration of workers then
makes the agglomeration forces stronger, which in turn increases workers’ utility.
Eventually, all workers end up living in the same city when commuting costs are
suﬃciently low.
Second, increasing commuting costs from low values of t does not necessarily
induce the decentralization of production within cities. When communication costs
are low, agglomeration still prevails and the city becomes polycentric instead of
being monocentric. However, this ceases to be true when communication costs are
large. In this case, workers get dispersed between two monocentric cities. Likewise,
as shown by Figure 2, a polycentric city may emerge even when commuting costs
are low (t<t m) provided that communication costs are low too. This is because
low commuting costs foster agglomeration, thus raising, all else equal, land rents,
and inducing, in ﬁne, the decentralization of production within the same city.
Third, when communication costs are fairly low, a progressive decrease in com-
muting costs yields an interesting picture. Again, Figure 2 will be our backbone. It
shows that the economy follows the path described below:
(p,p) → (p,m) → (p,0) → (m,0)
When commuting costs are large but communication costs low, the market forces
reduce the burden of urban costs by dispersing workers across cities as well as em-
ployment in each city. Below the threshold tp, commuting costs can sustain a larger
polycentric city, thus implying that city 2 becomes monocentric because its pop-
ulation is too low for this city to retain its polycentric structure. As t decreases
further, city 1 keeps growing at the expense of the small one, which vanishes when
t is suﬃciently low. Indeed, both communication and commuting costs take low
enough values to permit the agglomeration of activities within a single polycen-
tric city. Finally, when commuting costs take extremely low values, city 1 becomes
monocentric. This is because such a spatial arrangement allows ﬁrms and workers
to save on communication costs as commuting is almost inexpensive.
Given the discussion above, we may safely conclude that allowing for structural
changes within cities aﬀects both the global economy and the nature of trade.
195.2 How the global aﬀects the local
Figure 3 displays our main conditions in the (τ,t)-space. In what follows, we consider
the case of high commuting costs (t>T D). When trade costs are high, we see that
the economy involves a single polycentric city. The fact that commuting and trade
costs are high prevents both the existence of monocentric cities and the emergence
of a dispersed pattern. Once trade costs cross the line K = K, there is partial
dispersion with the creation of a small city that allows workers to reduce the burden
of urban costs in the large city. However, trade costs remain too large for that city
to capture a large share of activities. If trade costs keep decreasing and cross the
line t = tp, two stable equilibria exist.
In the ﬁrst one, the small city remains monocentric but attracts a growing share
o ft h el a b o rf o r c ea tt h ee x p e n s eo ft h el a r g ec i t y :
d(−δ2/δ1)
dτ
> 0 for all τ < τtrade.
In other words, as the global economy gets more integrated, less workers settle in
the large city, the partial re-dispersion of the economic activity being gradual. Yet,
the large city keeps hosting a large share of mobile activities.S t a t e dd i ﬀerently, as















when τ → 0. It is worth stressing the fact that this process, which is summarized
below, is smooth in that it involves the progressive growth of the small city together
with the gradual decline of the large one:
(p,0) → (p,m) →
(p,m)
(p,p)
In the second equilibrium, full dispersion with two polycentric cities prevails.
Because trade costs are low enough, the dispersion of activities does not hamper
inter-city trade, whereas high commuting costs leads to the decentralization of ac-
tivities. Although there is multiplicity of equilibria here, urban inertia is likely to
select the ﬁrst equilibrium. In this case, the economy shifts from agglomeration (and
no trade) to partial agglomeration (and asymmetric trade) when trade costs steadily
decline. Such an outcome is reminiscent of the bell-shaped curve of spatial devel-
opment - the sequence dispersion/agglomeration/re-dispersion - obtained in several
NEG-models with urban costs (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
Again, it is worth comparing the ﬁrst scheme of evolution to what happens when
cities are assumed to be monocentric (t<T A). In this case, Figure 3 shows that
agglomeration prevails below the line t = tm; otherwise there is always dispersion.
Therefore, when cities are allowed to become polycentric, the larger city is able
to maintain its primacy over a larger set of structural parameters, thus preventing
the complete re-dispersion of activities that would arise in the case of monocentric
cities. Thus, there is a need to extend the analysis of urban systems to cope with
polycentric cities, instead of focusing almost exclusively on monocentric cities as
existing theories do (Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004).
206C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have presented a simple model that uncovers how the interplay between diﬀerent
types of spatial friction aﬀects the location of economic activities between and within
cities. Historical evidence shows that both trade and commuting costs have been
decreasing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Ever since the end of the
19th century, the development of the new communication technologies has allowed
ﬁrms to alleviate the burden of urban costs in large metropolitan areas, through
the emergence of secondary employment centers. We have shown how these various
technological changes have impacted on the way ﬁrms and workers locate. Our re-
sults agree with empirical evidence. Thus, we may safely conclude that what matters
for the organization of the space-economy is the relative evolution of three types of
costs: the commuting of workers, the transfer of information and the transport of
commodities.
When cities are open to trade, the organization of the space-economy varies with
the ability of cities to accommodate a small or a large population. In particular, our
results show that, once agglomeration within a polycentric city has been achieved,
the core maintains its primacy over a large range of trade cost values, thus conﬁrming
the idea that the polycentric structure fosters agglomeration. Our analysis also
highlights the importance of local factors in the emergence of regional inequalities.
For example, agglomeration is more likely to occur when commuting costs take very
low values, but never arises when these costs are high.
The multiplicity of stable equilibria observed here has also an important im-
plication that has been very much overlooked in the literature: diﬀerent types of
spatial patterns may coexist under identical technological and economic conditions.
It should be no surprise, therefore, to observe a variety of urban systems in the real
world.
Finally, our analysis also has an important policy implication. It is well known
that quite a few American and European cities have lost employment and population
for a few decades. This state of aﬀair has led city managers to seek local policies
that would prevent the decentralization of industrial activities toward small and/or
remote places. However, most of them did fail. This paper suggests that urban
decision-makers would have been better inspired to foster the development of SBDs,
endowed with high-quality business-to-business services and consumption amenities
that attract both ﬁrms and workers.
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Appendix
The corresponding equilibrium wages (wC
r and wS
r for r =1 ,2) are such that all
ﬁrms, located either in the CBD or in the SBD of each city, earn zero proﬁts (given,
respectively, by (4) and (5)).




2 )a r es u c ht h a tn oﬁrm established in city 1 and located either in
the CBD or in the SBD of this city, or established in the CBD of city 2 is able to
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(2aφ + τcLλ)2(1 − λ)+( 2 aφ − 2τbφ − τcLλ)2λ
ª
.
When both cities are polycentric, wages wC
r (λ) and wS
r (λ) are given by (A) for
r =1 ,2.








CFigure 2:  Global equilibria in (K,t)-space
















k/φFigure 3:  Global equilibria in (τ,t)-space
(a=8, b=3, c=1, φ=1, L=100, k=1, K=50)
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